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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS  
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU  
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [KPKO](#) [AU](#) [UN](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: CDA TO MFA: SUDAN MUST SHOW "NEW REALITY" (CORRECTED COPY  
FOR KHARTOUM MRN 00965)

REF: KHARTOUM 925 KHARTOUM 947

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Sudan Lags in its Commitments  
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¶11. (SBU) In an introductory meeting with Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Siddiq Mutriff on June 16, CDA Fernandez said that many in the U.S. doubt Sudan's sincere commitment to resolve the Darfur conflict and instead viewed the Sudanese Government as responding only to pressure. "Everything you do contributes to the idea that you're only doing these because you're forced," said the CDA. Mutriff expressed his government's view that Sudan was criticized regardless of its actions and recommended that discussions on the Darfur conflict be resolved through dialogue on "technical" issues rather than through political rhetoric.

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Sudan Accepts "All Components" of Hybrid  
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¶12. (SBU) Mutriff said that Sudan had accepted the United Nations/African Union hybrid peace-keeping force "in all its components" during the June 11-12 consultations in Addis Ababa. He said that agreement between the UN, the AU, and the Sudanese Government on the force had been reached in "a neutral, professional, and technical manner." Mutriff had later explained the agreement in the presence of President Bashir, who concurred that Sudan "must commit to what we've agreed to." Mutriff suggested that acceptance of the hybrid be the basis for cooperation between Sudan and the U.S. "We need to do things out of our convictions," he stated. "If we do things because of sanctions or for improved relations, it won't work."

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Sudan Must Show "New Reality"  
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¶13. (SBU) The CDA said that the U.S. would be monitoring Sudan's adherence to the recent agreement with the UN and AU to show that it was interested in a "new reality." In order to change international perceptions of Sudan formed since 2003 and break the cycle of mutual recriminations, Sudan must be "clear" its sincerity to defuse the conflict by cooperating on the deployment of an effective peace-keeping force and contributing to a political solution. Pointing to Afghanistan and Palestine, the CDA noted the lasting repercussions of a generation of children growing up in camps and said it was "in Sudan's interest" to end the conflict. "All the people of Darfur should have a role in political life, a role in the future," he said.

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Street Opening: "A Terrible Idea"  
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¶14. (SBU) Calling the threat to open the street in front of the Embassy "a terrible idea," CDA said that the Sudanese Government would be blamed for any attack on diplomatic personnel. Mutriff said that he had advised the Governor of Khartoum State to meet with CDA (Ref. A) to discuss the issue. Recognizing that opponents of the Government could use the issue to "embarrass" Khartoum, Mutriff said that the security services were sympathetic to the problem and that security would be increased for the Embassy. CDA explained that the security services had requested that a diplomatic note be sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ref. B). Mutriff was unaware of this request.

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Conclusions from Addis Ababa  
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¶15. (SBU) At the conclusion of the meeting, Mutriff passed a document to CDA, which represented the conclusions of the recent consultations in Addis Ababa. In describing the mandate of the UN/AU hybrid, the document matched the UN/AU report on the mission with the exception of slight changes to the sections on rule of law and border security. The document differs slightly in its description of options one and two for the force size and calls for 651 fewer police officers. An explicit reference to Sudan's facilitation of access to land and water for the force is also absent. (Note: The document and a preliminary analysis of its contents was forwarded to AF/SPG on June 18. End note.)

FERNANDEZ